The Future Energy and GHG Emissions Impact of Alternative Personal Transportation Pathways in China by Kishimoto, P.N. et al.
 The Future Energy and GHG Emissions 
Impact of Alternative Personal 
Transportation Pathways in China
Paul N. Kishimoto, Sergey Paltsev and Valerie J. Karplus 
Report No. 231
September 2012
China Energy & Climate Project
TSINGHUA - MIT
The MIT Joint Program on the Science and Policy of Global Change is an organization for research, independent policy 
analysis, and public education in global environmental change. It seeks to provide leadership in understanding scientific, 
economic, and ecological aspects of this difficult issue, and combining them into policy assessments that serve the needs 
of ongoing national and international discussions. To this end, the Program brings together an interdisciplinary group from 
two established research centers at MIT: the Center for Global Change Science (CGCS) and the Center for Energy and 
Environmental Policy Research (CEEPR). These two centers bridge many key areas of the needed intellectual work, and 
additional essential areas are covered by other MIT departments, by collaboration with the Ecosystems Center of the Marine 
Biology Laboratory (MBL) at Woods Hole, and by short- and long-term visitors to the Program. The Program involves 
sponsorship and active participation by industry, government, and non-profit organizations. 
To inform processes of policy development and implementation, climate change research needs to focus on improving the 
prediction of those variables that are most relevant to economic, social, and environmental effects. In turn, the greenhouse 
gas and atmospheric aerosol assumptions underlying climate analysis need to be related to the economic, technological, and 
political forces that drive emissions, and to the results of international agreements and mitigation. Further, assessments of 
possible societal and ecosystem impacts, and analysis of mitigation strategies, need to be based on realistic evaluation of the 
uncertainties of climate science. 
This report is one of a series intended to communicate research results and improve public understanding of climate issues, 
thereby contributing to informed debate about the climate issue, the uncertainties, and the economic and social implications 
of policy alternatives. Titles in the Report Series to date are listed on the inside back cover.
Ronald G. Prinn and John M. Reilly
Program Co-Directors
      For more information, please contact the Joint Program Office
              Postal Address:      Joint Program on the Science and Policy of Global Change
                 77 Massachusetts Avenue
      MIT E19-411
      Cambridge MA 02139-4307 (USA)
       Location: 400 Main Street, Cambridge
      Building E19, Room 411
      Massachusetts Institute of Technology
              Access: Phone: +1.617. 253.7492
        Fax: +1.617.253.9845
      E-mail: globalchange@mit.edu
      Web site: http://globalchange.mit.edu/
   Printed on recycled paper
The Future Energy and GHG Emissions Impact of Alternative Personal Transportation
Pathways in China
Paul N. Kishimoto,∗† Sergey Paltsev∗ and Valerie J. Karplus∗
Abstract
A major uncertainty in future energy and greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions projections for China is
the evolution of demand for personal transportation modes. This paper explores the implications of
divergent personal transportation scenarios, either favoring private vehicles, or emphasizing a sector
including all purchased transport (including local public transit, rail and aviation) as substitute for
vehicle travel. Motivated by a wide range of forecasts for transport indicators in the literature, we
construct plausible scenarios with low-, medium- and high-transport demand growth, and implement
them in a technology-rich model which represents opportunities for fuel economy improvement and
switching to plug-in hybrid-electric vehicles (PHEVs). The analysis compares primary energy use and
GHG emissions in China in the absence and presence of climate policies. We find that a policy that
extends the current Chinese emissions-intensity goals through 2050 mostly affects other sectors with
lower abatement costs, and so only lightly engages household transport, permitting nearly the same
large increases in refined oil demand (by more than five times) and private vehicle stocks (to 430–500
million) as in the reference case. A stringent climate stabilization policy affects household transport,
limiting vehicle ownership and petroleum demand, but drives up the share of household spending on
transport, and carries high economy-wide costs. The large projected scale of vehicle fleets, refined
oil use and transport purchases all suggest that the rate and type of travel demand growth deserves
attention by policymakers, as China seeks to address its energy, environmental, and economic goals.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Policies which affect China’s future energy use and associated greenhouse gas (GHG) emis-
sions growth trajectory have the potential to substantially impact climate change outcomes at the
end of this century (Paltsev et al., 2012). As its energy use and GHG emissions have increased by
factors of 5 and 4.6, respectively, over the past three decades, China’s share of the global totals
has also grown (CDIAC, 2011; BP, 2012). While China has announced energy and carbon inten-
sity targets through 2020, meeting targets in 2020 and beyond depends on technology choices and
∗Joint Program on the Science and Policy of Global Change, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge,
Massachusetts, USA.
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behavioral responses by consumers and firms across the economy, and also on the design of gov-
ernment policies. How these choices and responses are likely to evolve with continued increases
in disposable income is a source of considerable uncertainty in future projections of energy use
and GHG emissions.
Personal mobility today is a major energy-consuming activity that tends to increase as GDP
rises, although the relationship is not uniform and has been shown to depend on a range of factors
such as population density or degree of urbanization (Schäfer and Victor, 2000; Dargay et al.,
2007; Leaver et al., 2012). In recent years, demand for vehicle ownership and use, as well as pur-
chased modes of travel, has increased rapidly. Today, the transport sector accounts for around
8% of total energy use in China, compared to 28% in the United States and 17% in the European
Union (EEA, 2011; U.S. EIA, 2011). Despite its small share in China’s energy mix, petroleum
requirements of the existing vehicle fleet have raised policy concerns about reliance on imported
resources and tailpipe contributions to poor air quality, particularly in urban areas. Policymakers
in China are discussing the appropriate combination of support for new energy vehicles and pur-
chased alternatives to vehicle transport in order to address climate, energy, and air quality goals.
This analysis identifies the energy and GHG impacts of scenarios that assume different levels of
reliance on purchased modes relative to privately-owned vehicles, and considers how policy will
interact with these preferences.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 summarizes key historical trends in passenger
travel volume and mode shares, in particular the recent and current rapid increase in the owner-
ship and use of passenger vehicles. We outline the motivation for the present work by comparing
the emissions intensities of these rapidly growing modes with others, and reviewing recent litera-
ture which forecasts China’s personal mobility (including vehicle) demand. Section 3 introduces
the EPPA model, the development of three scenarios for demand growth of vehicles relative to
other modes, and the method for implementing these scenarios in the model. Section 4 describes
the energy use and GHG emissions impacts in each of the scenarios in the presence and absence
of a CO2-equivalent constraint, which is implemented as an economy-wide cap-and-trade system.
Section 5 offers general conclusions based on the results.
2. BACKGROUND
2.1 Evolution of transport demand in China
Figure 1 presents historical data on passenger transport in China on the basis of passenger
distance traveled (PDT), the sum of the lengths of all individual trips on each mode.1 As re-
cently as 1980, rail travel provided the largest share of PDT, but road travel—including pur-
1 PDT is also referred to as PKT (in kilometers) or PMT (in miles), and is related to vehicle distance traveled (VDT;
similarly VKT or VMT) through the number of passengers per vehicle, usually termed occupancy for private
vehicles, or load factor for rail and air transport.
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Figure 1. Historical mode share of passenger transport in China by distance travelled, 1978–2010 (Na-
tional Bureau of Statistics of China, 2012a).
chased transport on buses and taxis, company- or government-owned vehicles, and private ve-
hicle travel—overtook rail by 1990, and has since grown to nearly 55% of all travel. In abso-
lute terms, the total travel volume has increased rapidly, accelerating with China’s economic
growth since 2000. While rail and air travel continue to increase—with civil aviation doubling
in PDT between 2005 and 2010—road transport continues to contribute the largest total mileage
increases to passenger transport demand.
2.2 Contribution of passenger vehicles
Understanding how China’s vehicle fleet will grow in the future requires understanding re-
gional disparities in travel demand. As shown in Figure 2, there is not a tight correspondence
between annual per capita income and levels of private household vehicle ownership in China
across its provinces. Beijing and Shanghai, the two provinces with the highest per-capita in-
comes, had very different levels of vehicle ownership in 2009. Hao et al. (2011) discuss how
Shanghai’s decade-old license plate auction policy has significantly reduced ownership by in-
creasing the costs of vehicle ownership relative to Beijing, but other, quota-free provinces such
as Tianjin display low ownership with high GDP relative to the national average. As disposable
income grows, whether the less developed provinces follow a trajectory closer to Beijing or to
Shanghai will—together with region-specific demands for travel—determine energy and envi-
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Figure 2. Static income–ownership relationship for Chinese provinces as of 2009 (National Bureau of
Statistics of China, 2011). Each data point corresponds to a Chinese province, which are grouped into
six regions. The four direct-controlled municipalities are labelled.
ronmental impact in the nation as a whole. Another critical source of uncertainty is consumers’
willingness and ability to substitute between purchased modes and private vehicle ownership (Hu
et al., 2010).
The main contribution of this analysis is to understand the implications of meeting rising
travel demand through different modes in a framework that allows for different assumptions
about how vehicle ownership will grow with income and captures inter-modal competition for
transportation fuels. Most forecasts of transportation energy use in China have been performed
with bottom-up vehicle fleet and energy accounting models that take vehicle stock, distance trav-
eled, vehicle fuel economy and powertrain technology, and fuel prices (if used) as given—including
those discussed later in Section 2.4 and shown in Figure 3. A few studies of the impacts of poli-
cies on transportation energy use have been conducted using energy-economic models with broad
sectoral coverage (Zhou et al., 2011). Schäfer and Jacoby (2006) incorporate price feedbacks to
demand and capture endogenously the impact of global climate policy on transport mode shares
and technology choice using a coupled top-down bottom-up modeling approach. Here we use
a technology-rich top-down model to simulate exogenously imposed relationships between in-
come growth and shares of PDT provided by purchased modes and privately-owned vehicles.
This economy-wide energy-economic framework further allows us to perform an initial assess-
ment of the impact of emissions and other constraints on transportation energy use and CO2
emissions outcomes under alternative mode share scenarios. Although our analysis includes a
4
Table 1. Energy intensity of transport, by mode (National Bureau of Statistics of China, 2012b).
China Japan
Mode 2005 2008 2005 2008
Passenger [105J/passenger·km]
Car 39.7 35.1 25.1 23.6
Bus 6.5 6.5 7.1 6.7
Rail 1.8 1.7 2.1 2.0
Air 20.1 18.6 18.1 19.8
Freight [105J/t·km]
Automobile 44.4 43.9 32.5 30.3
Rail 2.8 2.8 2.5 2.4
Waterway 13.7 11.0 10.0 8.4
Air 225.1 208.4 216.7 211.7
plug-in hybrid-electric vehicle (PHEV) technology, we focus here on the transport sector effects
of economy-wide emissions policy, as other work (Karplus et al., 2012a) examines the effects of
sector-specific policy for private household transport, namely fuel economy mandates, and sensi-
tivity to the costs of alternate powertrains.
2.3 Energy & emissions factors by mode in China and discussion
The significance of historical mode shifts, as mentioned Section 2.1, with growing overall de-
mand and an increasing popularity of private vehicles in road transport, is further emphasized
when the energy- and emissions-intensities of these modes are compared. Table 1 gives official
data from the National Bureau of Statistics of China on energy intensity of transport by mode for
both passenger and freight transport, including their comparison with like figures from Japan,
while Table 2 summarizes a variety of studies from recent years on the CO2 emissions intensities
of the same modes in China, or internationally where Chinese data is unavailable.
The low occupancy of private vehicles makes them several times more energy- and emissions-
intensive than bus travel. Even with a constant share of PDT for passenger road transport, a shift
(driven by increasing income or other factors) from purchased bus travel to own-supplied car
travel would bring an attendant increase in energy use and emissions. For long-distance or inter-
city travel, light duty private vehicles are also an energy-intensive choice. Also, while China has
a growing suite of policies designed to promote the development and sales of alternative-fuel or
“New Energy Vehicles” (NEVs)—including plug-in hybrid- and battery-electric vehicles—(Gong
et al., 2012), studies show that the emissions-intensity of these vehicles does not represent a large
improvement on gasoline vehicles when there are recharged from China’s coal-heavy electrical
grid (Ou et al., 2010).
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Table 2. Comparison of existing estimates of Chinese passenger transport emissions intensity, by mode.
Where the cited studies provide ranges, these are reproduced; average figures are shown in parentheses.
The starred figures for intercity rail are for the United States and Europe; actual Chinese values would
differ according to technology, operations and—as noted by Ou et al. (2010)—the higher, regionally-varied
emissions intensity of Chinese electricity used to drive the trains.
Mode CO2 emissions [g/passenger·km] Source
Road
Bicycle < 4 Cherry et al. (2009)
Bus 24–97 ”
2 wheelers
Electric scooter 20–40 ”
Gasoline moped 65 Yan and Crookes (2010)
Motorcycle 64–128 Cherry et al. (2009)
Cars 102–306 ”
Battery-electric 35–162 (131) Ou et al. (2010)
Gasoline 200 ”
Rail
Urban/metro/subway 49 Yan and Crookes (2010)
High-speed intercity* 10–120 (21) Kosinski et al. (2011)
Regular-speed intercity* 14 Kageson (2009)
Air 100–500 (150) Chester and Horvath (2010)
2.4 Previous work
The relationship between rising personal mobility demand and energy and emissions out-
comes has been extensively studied in previous global, regional, national, and sub-national fore-
casting exercises. These studies span the transport demand modeling and energy economics lit-
eratures, and employ a wide range of methods and techniques. Studies vary in the number of dif-
ferent demand drivers they consider. Schäfer and Victor (2000) employ an empirically-estimated
travel-time budget and travel-money budget (as a fraction of income) to forecast demand for dif-
ferent modes over time, modeling a shift to ever-faster modes as income increases. Other models
focus on vehicle ownership and include additional factors such as urbanization and population
density (Dargay et al., 2007) or account explicitly for changes in the household transport expen-
ditures and demand as disposable incomes rise (Meyer et al., 2007).
Studies of China’s future transport energy and CO2 emissions begin with projections of de-
mand for vehicle-kilometers traveled or passenger-kilometers traveled. Most China-related trans-
port studies to date have focused on demand for vehicles and vehicle travel (Wang et al., 2006;
Dargay et al., 2007; Han and Hayashi, 2008; Wang et al., 2011; Huo et al., 2011a,b; A.T. Kear-
ney, 2011; Barclays Capital, 2011), while less attention has been focused on demand for pur-
chased modes. As shown in Figure 3, projections of vehicle stock vary widely. From the early
2000s through 2011 most studies underestimated the rate of light-duty or privately-owned vehicle
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Figure 3. Projected growth of total vehicles in use (stock) through 2050 by various studies. “Wang
(JK)” and “Wang (all)” refer to the projections from Wang et al. (2011) using the Japan/Korea and
all-countries panels, respectively. The Argonne National Laboratory (ANL) Low-, Medium- and High-
growth projections are from Wang et al. (2006); others from (Dargay et al., 2007; A.T. Kearney, 2011;
Barclays Capital, 2011; International Energy Agency, 2011).
fleet growth; projecting a 2010 vehicle population of 47–54 million against an actual figure of 78
million (Wang et al., 2011; National Bureau of Statistics of China, 2011). This disparity is due
primarily to variation in the estimates of new vehicle sales growth over the same period. Studies
also differ in the assumptions on vehicle fuel efficiency and annual kilometers-traveled per vehi-
cle, leading to a wide range of projections of refined fuel demand and CO2 emissions.
3. METHODOLOGY
3.1 The MIT Emissions Prediction & Policy Analysis (EPPA) model
The model used in this analysis is a specialized version of the MIT Emissions Prediction and
Policy Analysis (EPPA) model that includes a technology-rich representation of the passenger
vehicle transport sector and its substitution with purchased modes, represented as the aggregate
of aviation, long- and short-distance rail, marine and public road transport. The EPPA model is a
recursive-dynamic general equilibrium model of the world economy developed by the Joint Pro-
gram on the Science and Policy of Global Change at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology
(Paltsev et al., 2005). The model is built using the Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) dataset
(Hertel, 1997; Dimaranan and McDougall, 2002). For use in EPPA, GTAP data are aggregated
into 16 regions and 24 sectors with several advanced technology sectors. Accounts of Kyoto Pro-
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tocol greenhouse gases2 are based on GTAP and United States Environmental Protection Agency
inventory data, and air pollutants are from the EDGAR database (as documented in Waugh et al.,
2011).
Several features were incorporated into the EPPA model to explicitly represent passenger ve-
hicle transport sector detail. These features include an empirically-based parameterization of
the relationship between income growth and demand for vehicle-miles traveled, a representa-
tion of fleet turnover, and opportunities for fuel use and emissions abatement. These model de-
velopments, which constitute the EPPA5-HTRN version of the model, are described in detail in
Karplus et al. (2012b).
The present work also contains a renewed calibration of the private vehicle sectors, with spe-
cial attention paid to China, using up-to-date data from sources including the World Energy Bal-
ances (International Energy Agency, 2010), Passport GMID (Euromonitor International, 2011),
and the World Road Statistics databases (International Road Federation, 2010).
3.2 Scenarios of travel demand growth
Surveying the projections for transport indicators illustrated in Figure 3, we observe that they
differ greatly; are generated using a variety of methods; and, where the methods include a param-
eterization of hypothetical peak vehicle ownership, set that level in China at a variety of levels
relative to those in other countries—from Japan’s 325 per thousand capita on the low side, to the
United States’ 820 per thousand capita on the high side (International Road Federation, 2010).
Motivated by the wide range of these projections, while not seeking to reproduce them directly,
we develop three scenarios which (1) represent possible futures with low-, medium- and high de-
mand for household transport and purchased vehicles, (2) do not repeat earlier studies’ underes-
timation of vehicle fleet growth, and (3) do not exceed a reasonable maximum of 15% household
budget share for transport3 in the reference case. The method used is as follows.
The constant elasticity of substitution (CES) utility of the EPPA representative household
results in demand shares for commodities that tend to be preserved even as total consumption
grows. In the case of transport, this means that expenditure on each of purchased and private
vehicle transport grows at the same rate as GDP. China’s recent experience of rapidly demand
growth is remarkable because, as highlighted in Wang et al. (2011) and elsewhere, it has held at
several points above the rate of GDP growth for several years. This indicates a rising share of ex-
penditure for transport.
To recreate this trend and its potential continuation in EPPA, the reference household expendi-
ture on transport is adjusted so that output vehicle stocks match observed values. In all scenarios,
2 Carbon dioxide, CO2; methane, CH4; nitrous oxide, N2O; hydrofluorocarbons, HFCs; perfluorocarbons, PFCs; and
sulphur hexafluoride, SF6.
3 This according to a range of 5–15% for developed countries given by Schäfer (1998).
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the total demand for travel is scaled upwards until the most recent model period (2010), so that
outputs for private transport match available data. A final adjustment in the 2010–2015 period is
different among our scenarios, and produces three trajectories in demand growth.
The scenarios also encode an assumption following Schäfer and Victor (2000) that the most
rapid growth in travel demand will come with a stronger preference for faster modes (personal
vehicles, fast and high speed rail, air) over slower ones (urban buses, two-wheeled vehicles, bicy-
cles and walking). Because purchased transport in China is currently composed mostly of lower-
speed modes,4 we model this behavior by depressing the share of purchased transport in total
consumption, so that the additional activity resulting from increased household transport expen-
diture involves a greater fraction of own-supplied than purchased transport. This effect is most
pronounced in the high vehicle ownership scenario. Finally, in all scenarios the income share of
transport in the overall household budget is attenuated in the later periods.
The EPPA-HTRN model structure includes a substitution elasticity of 0.2 between purchased
and own-supplied transport, so these adjustments to observed activity and the per-scenario re-
lationships between modes only hold in the absence of policy (i.e. the business-as-usual pro-
jection). In particular, vehicle stocks are allowed to change from their adjusted reference levels
in response to the policies outlined below. Direct and indirect effects of policy alter the relative
prices of travel obtained from the two modes, so in each successive period the representative Chi-
nese household may shift travel activity in either direction.
3.3 Policies
Model runs for all three scenarios were conducted both with and without climate policy. Runs
without policy provide a reference, business-as-usual projection. Two climate policies both in-
volve economy-wide caps on carbon dioxide emissions, without emissions trading between Ky-
oto Protocol gases or between China and other EPPA regions. Both policies begin in 2020. Un-
like Karplus et al. (2012a), which uses other capabilities of EPPA-HTRN to assess the effect of
fuel economy standards imposed on household vehicles in China and other regions, the policies
we study here are selected to identify the relative participation of household transport relative to
other sectors in China specifically.
One policy models the extension through 2050 of current commitments under the Chinese
Twelfth Five-Year Plan (12-FYP), which covers the years 2011 through 2015 inclusive. The spe-
cific 12-FYP target is to reduce the CO2 emissions intensity of GDP by 17% over the plan’s pe-
riod. In the Eleventh Five-Year Plan, a 20% reduction target was specified in a similar manner,
and a 19% reduction achieved (Deutsche Bank, 2011). Additionally, figures cited by China in in-
ternational negotiations indicate an 11–18% reduction in the period of the Thirteenth Five-Year
4 i.e. high speed rail and aviation have small, albeit growing, shares.
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Plan (yet to be published) (Casey and Koleski, 2011), assuming the 12-FYP target is met. Ac-
cordingly, we apply a CO2 emissions intensity reduction of 17% every five years (that is, every
EPPA period) from 2020 onwards. Multiplying the business-as-usual GDP projection by the tar-
get intensity yields the capped amount of CO2 emissions. This policy is referred to as the FYP
extension policy, or simply “FYP” in figures.
Second, we use an aggressive climate stabilization policy derived from Clarke et al. (2009) via
Paltsev et al. (2012), wherein global quotas on emissions are designed to result in end-of-century
greenhouse gas concentrations of 550 parts per million CO2 equivalent. The policy becomes ac-
tive in 20205 and achieves 50% of reference-case emissions in 2050, where our model runs end.
Every EPPA region follows the same trajectory of percentage reductions relative to reference.
Such a policy imposes substantial changes to an energy system at a significant cost. There are
certain ways to achieve a global target at a lower cost for China by participating in global emis-
sions trading or through financial transfers (Jacoby et al., 2009). Here we focus on an aggressive
implementation to represent large emissions reductions. This ensures that other sectors with a
lower marginal cost of abatement relative to household transport are engaged, so that household
transport itself is eventually marginal and participates significantly in achieving the emissions
target. Studying this policy allows us to examine these effects in the model outputs.
4. RESULTS
In Figures 4–10 we present results and implications with a focus on primary energy, emis-
sions—both in absolute terms and per unit of household travel—as well as vehicle ownership,
costs, and the shares of purchased and private vehicle transport. Outcomes for each policy are
compared to the reference projection, and notable differences between results under the low-,
medium- and high-demand scenarios are noted.
Figure 4 gives total primary energy use in the reference (no policy) and policy cases, by source.
Under business-as-usual, demand for petroleum rises sharply, to as much as 33% of all primary
energy, or in absolute terms by a factor of 5.4 in the medium-demand scenario, and demand grows
even in the last period projected (2045–2050). The Five-Year Plan extension policy has mod-
est impacts, which more strongly affect emissions-intensive fuels and as well as fuels for which
lower-cost abatement opportunities exist. In particular, coal use peaks by 2030–2035 under this
policy and declines while oil demand is constant in later periods, with the result that refined oil
has a larger share of a smaller energy total in 2050.
In contrast, the climate stabilization policy has effects which are dramatic in both the short-
and long-term, which highlights the aggressive nature of this type of policy in China, and its high
associated costs. The consumption of transport fuels derived from oil (in deep blue) shows reduc-
tions that are large, yet smaller than those experienced by coal-fired energy, reflecting the relative
5 The earliest date conceivable given the state of current international negotiations.
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Figure 4. Total Chinese primary energy by source and year, in the medium growth scenario; under
business-as-usual (a), the Five-Year Plan extension policy (b), and the climate stabilization policy (c).
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Figure 5. Oil projections, by year. (a) Chinese refined oil use in household transportation, and (b) global
oil price. For visual simplicity, some projections are shown as a band between the low- and high-
demand scenario results, with the medium-demand scenario as a solid line. The shaded area does not
represent a range of uncertainty or indicate the likelihood of values other than those resulting from the
three scenarios.
difficulty of switching to alternate fuels in transport. The effect of this policy is a sharp initial re-
duction in oil consumption, followed by a very gradual growth through 2030 (reaching 38–46%
of reference case demand) and then slow decline to 21–24% of reference demand. Less visible
in the figure is the increase in advanced, low-carbon biofuels, which are not adopted in the refer-
ence case, but peak at 2.3–3.1 exajoules (EJ) (7–8% of combined oil plus biofuel demand) under
policy.
Figure 5(a) displays final, rather than primary energy, and focuses on refined oil used to power
passenger vehicle transport. Under business-as-usual and the Five-Year Plan extension policy, de-
mand continues to grow strongly through 2050, passing the current United States level of about
120 billion gallons gasoline per year (U.S. EIA, 2012) by 2025, and approaching or exceeding
2.5 times that level by 2050. With the FYP policy providing incentives to both reduce driving ac-
tivity and also invest in more expensive vehicle capital with greater fuel economy, refined oil use
is slightly lower. The climate stabilization policy eventually halts growth in refined oil demand
in absolute terms, by 2040 at a level of 130 billion gallons per year in the medium-demand sce-
nario, slightly above the current level for all U.S. light duty vehicles. Figure 5(b) demonstrates
the global effect of China’s large demand by showing the market price for crude oil. The slight
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Figure 6. Change in consumption due to policy relative to reference case, by year. The low-demand pro-
jections result in smaller percentage decreases, so the shaded band is inverted in comparison to other
figures.
decrease in domestic refined oil use under the FYP policy reduces the global price by about 6%,
and the effectively capped demand under the climate stabilization policy lowers the world price
by over 45 USD, both by 2050. Even in this scenario, the global oil price stays in the range of
80–100 USD.
Figure 6 shows the percentage change in aggregate consumption measured as equivalent vari-
ation relative to the business-as-usual value. Consumption is one measure of welfare in EPPA,
and change in consumption a measure of policy cost. The Five-Year Plan extension policy is
notable for its small impact on overall consumption, reducing it by only 1% in 2030 and 2.2%
by 2050. The stringent climate policy, on the other hand, has a large impact in the initial period
(2015–2020) of 7–8% of consumption relative to reference, with consumption falling to 15–17%
below the business-as-usual value in the final period. Compared to the base effect of each policy,
the incremental effect of stronger travel demand on the policy cost is small.
The magnitude and relative demand for travel by purchased and private vehicle transport are
illustrated in Figure 7, with each case evolving from the current situation in the lower left. The
unadjusted reference trend is also shown, to illustrate a hypothetical situation of growth with
constant shares for purchased and own-supplied modes. Under business-as-usual, each scenario
shows its designed, increased preference for own-supplied transport, as well as higher or lower
levels of total travel demand.
Under the Five-Year Plan extension policy, total travel volume decreases, while the relative
departure from constant mode shares remains the same; the points on the FYP trajectories fall be-
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tween the corresponding points on the BAU projections and the origin. The climate stabilization
policy, however, has an opposite effect; the mode preference imposed in each scenario cannot be
met to the same degree as household budgets are stretched to cover both fuel with high carbon
price attached and more expensive vehicles which provide travel with less fuel. Overall house-
hold transport activity reaches, by 2050, a level comparable to the 2025 state of the reference pro-
jection, and the imposed high demand is met with a greater reliance on purchased modes.
Within the own-supplied portion of these volume projections, though not shown in Figure 7,
PHEV technology is adopted in response to policy, and by mid-century 5.2–6.3% of PDT under
the FYP policy, and 15–17% under the climate stabilization policy, are supplied by plug-in hybrid
vehicles.
Figure 8 shows per-capita vehicle ownership under each policy, resembling Figure 5 aside
from some key differences. Households investing in more efficient vehicles under each policy can
satisfy their higher demand for travel with lower fuel input; this allows own-supplied transport
volume and vehicle ownership to grow at a greater rate than refined oil demand. Consequently,
while Figure 5 shows a peak in fuel use under the climate stabilization policy, vehicle ownership
continues to increase to the level of 200 vehicles per thousand capita by mid-century. Likewise,
the Five-Year Plan extension policy projections more closely overlay the business-as-usual pro-
jections, with per-capita ownership continuing to increase steadily in 2045–2050. However, the
level of household vehicle ownership at this point—below 400 per thousand capita—still remains
low in comparison to the that of current mature markets with constant ownership, such as the Eu-
ropean Union at 475 per thousand capita (International Energy Agency, 2011).
Energy and emissions intensities are given in Figure 9 and Figure 10 respectively. The ref-
erence projections in both cases reflect the combined effects of autonomous energy efficient im-
provement (AEEI), a representation in the EPPA model of technology and other improvements
made in the household transport and other sectors which do not occur in response to price, yet re-
sult in decreasing energy intensity of production (in this case, of passenger travel volume) with
time. In Figure 10, AEEI can be observed within the own-supplied transport subsector; how-
ever, because of the mode shift from purchased transport with a low emissions-intensity to own-
supplied transport, the mode-weighted average emissions intensity of household transport in-
creases in the reference case. In Figure 9, a small effect of higher demand is visible: faced with
higher costs to provide that demand, households invest slightly more in vehicles with better fuel
economy.
The effect of the Five-Year Plan extension policy is a slight improvement in the overall en-
ergy intensity of household transport, by about 5% across cases relative to business-as-usual or
16% over time from 2015 to 2050. The FYP extension policy achieves a 70% reduction in energy
intensity of GDP across the same period. While GDP and transport volume do not evolve identi-
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Figure 7. Trajectories of purchased and own-supplied transport, by scenario, with “constant mode share”
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Table 3. Other projection outcomes summarized.
Low demand Medium demand High demand
BAU FYP 550 BAU FYP 550 BAU FYP 550
Expenditure share of transport [%]
2030, total 10.5 10.3 12.9 12.1 12.0 15.4 14.0 14.0 18.6
purchased 3.1 3.1 3.0 3.6 3.5 3.5 4.1 4.0 4.0
own-supplied 7.4 7.3 9.9 8.5 8.5 11.9 9.8 9.9 14.5
2050, total 10.2 10.2 18.5 11.2 11.3 21.5 11.9 12.1 23.7
purchased 2.2 2.2 2.0 2.4 2.4 2.2 2.6 2.5 2.3
own-supplied 8.0 8.1 16.5 8.8 9.0 19.3 9.3 9.6 21.4
Vehicle stock [106]
2030 239 236 182 280 276 209 332 325 241
2040 342 331 221 394 379 246 437 419 265
2050 448 430 241 496 474 257 530 505 268
cally, the large disparity reflects the high cost of energy use reductions in the household transport
sector. The slight gains from improved vehicle energy efficiency serve to offset the noted effect
of mode shift, so that emissions intensity is essentially flat under this policy.
The climate stabilization policy results in a large improvement in average energy intensity
of transport, by about 35% between 2015 and 2050. Under higher demand for transport, these
improvements occur sooner than with low demand, and as expensive powertrain improvements
become an economic substitute for more expensive fuel, the emissions intensity of own-supplied
transport shows a continued decline that more than offsets the effect of a less pronounced shift
away from low-emissions purchased modes.
Expenditures on own-supplied transport can also be converted into estimates of vehicle stock,
under an assumption that the amount of non-powertrain capital per individual vehicle remains the
same as in the base period. Table 3 contains these data, as well as the share in overall household
consumption for each type of transport. Examining the expenditure share under the aggressive
550/stabilization policy, it is notable that households consume considerably more own-supplied
transport—up to ten times as much as purchased transport—even as the total travel budget goes
to the unrealistically high level of 21.4% in the medium-demand scenario. This is a reflection of
the EPPA model’s previously-calibrated elasticity of substitution σ = 0.2 between purchased
and own-supplied transport. Testing the sensitivity to much easier modal substitution (σ = 0.8),
we find the ratio of own-supplied to purchased consumption drops to about 3.5, while the total
travel budget drops to 18%.6 In practice, action by government, technology development or other
factors might arise in the face of combined high fuel costs and transport demand to ease the sub-
6 Still, however, outside the range of 5–15% noted in Section 3.2.
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Figure 11. Total China vehicle stock, by year. Range of EPPA projections displayed as shaded bands;
overlaid on projections from literature as in Figure 3 (green).
stitution from vehicles to purchased modes.
Figure 11 shows that the vehicle stock results for the reference scenarios are, by design, within
the range of the projections from literature, aside from not repeating the under-prediction of ear-
lier studies to 2010, and not pushing reference case household transport expenditure share above
the maximum plausible level of 15% in early periods. The model tracks constant-quality vehicles,
where spending on vehicle luxury is, at present, assumed to be captured elsewhere in the con-
sumption bundle. If, as in the United States, Chinese consumers buy more expensive vehicles on
average as their wealth increases, actual stock may be lower. Regardless, the figures illustrate the
large impact of even moderate levels of ownership in a very large country. In later periods, high
costs cause our scenarios to yield lower stocks than most other projections which run to 2050;
with policy, this difference is more pronounced.
5. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we studied three pathways of increasing travel demand in China, both on their
own and in the absence of a representative climate policy required for stabilization. Across model
outcomes, the policy example which continues through 2050 the economy-wide emissions inten-
sity reductions in current Chinese policy does not significantly affect transport, and permits con-
tinued growth in amounts of own-supplied vehicle travel, as well as attendant growth in refined
oil use and emissions from transport. In contrast, a stringent policy in which China participates
in significant emissions reductions affects overall economic welfare, including transport growth,
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heavily—highlighting the trade-off between promoting development and environmental goals.
These conclusions are robust across a range of assumptions about differing growth in demand for
household transport and mode emphasis, although the highest forecast demand results in espe-
cially acute choices for household expenditure.
When rapid growth in Chinese household transport follows the elsewhere observed shift away
from purchased modes to private vehicles, overall emissions intensity of travel grows even as the
intensity of the individual modes declines. Conversely, changes in passenger travel mode share
induced by policy can limit or reverse this effect. However, more detailed analysis which repre-
sents low- and high-speed purchased modes (and their substitutability) separately is necessary to
estimate these effects with precision.
More particular results include a larger role for biofuels under policy, with the stabilization
policy arresting growth in fuel use and overall demand for both own-supplied and purchased PDT
by about 2030. Without policy, oil becomes nearly as prominent as coal in the primary energy
mix, and even with a very large share of income devoted to transport in the high-ownership sce-
nario, per-capita vehicle ownership levels remain well below those in mature markets. Under the
climate stabilization policy, approximately 16% of household vehicle transport is derived from
hybrid vehicles, but under the emissions intensity policy this alternate vehicle technology only
supplies 5% of passenger travel distance.
In light of an objective to reduce energy intensity by 45% between 2005 and 2020 and other
targets (Deutsche Bank, 2011; Paltsev et al., 2012), we find that even under aggressive climate
policy the extent to which the household transport sector can offer reductions is limited. The high
growth and resilience to policy in this segment will be a factor which offsets the impact of tar-
geted measures in other areas. Given the great uncertainty in the literature about the range in fu-
ture demand, and its consequences on emissions as shown here, alternative pathways for growth
deserve attention as an important component of overall policy.
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